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Commission Legislative Work Programme reference 
2006/INFSO/001. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This Impact Assessment (IA) describes the options considered for the Review of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(eCommunications) and provides background for the proposed changes presented in the 
Commission’s Communication on the Review.  
The regulatory framework for eCommunications includes five Directives adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2002 that became applicable from 2003: the Access 
Directive (2002/19/EC), the Authorisation Directive (2002/20/EC), the Framework Directive 
(2002/21/EC); the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC), and the e-Privacy Directive 
(2002/58/EC)
1. Alongside these Directives are several complementary measures as described 
in Annex 1. 
In keeping with the principles of ‘better regulation’, these five Directives have to be reviewed 
periodically, with the first review taking place in 2006.
2 In parallel, the Commission is 
reviewing the list of markets susceptible of ex ante regulation in the Recommendation on 
relevant markets
3 under the current Directives.  
Main characteristics of the regulatory framework  
- The framework provides a common set of rules for all communications that are transmitted 
electronically. Its objectives are to encourage competition in the eCommunications markets, 
to improve the functioning of the Internal Market and to protect the interests of European 
citizens.  
- Competition is not an end in itself, but a means to promote innovation, investment and 
consumer welfare.  
- Where market forces alone may not fully meet the public interest, the framework safeguards 
consumer interests and guarantees basic user rights in areas such as universal service and 
processing of personal data and right to privacy. 
- The framework is technology-neutral, applying the same regulatory principles regardless of 
the specific technology involved, and is designed to be future proof, and to take account of the 
convergence of digital technologies that allow everything from phone calls to entertainment to 
be delivered over all sorts of networks to all sorts of devices - PCs, televisions, mobile 
phones, wire and wireless technologies and more. 
                                                 
1  OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7; OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21; OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.33; OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, 
p. 51; and OJ L 201, 31.07.2002, p. 37 respectively. 
2  The Liberalisation Directive, i.e. Commission Directive 2002/77EC on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 249, 17.09.2002, p. 21), is not covered by this 
review. 
3  OJ L114, 08.05.2003, p. 45.  
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2.  PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW AND THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
The purpose of this review is to examine: 
–  how well the regulatory framework has achieved its objectives; and  
–  how the framework should be changed in the light of technological and market 
developments
4 so that it continues to meet the needs of the sector over the coming decade. 
The Review also takes into account policy developments that have taken place since the 
framework was adopted that need to be incorporated into the EU legal framework.  
The Commission Communication is launching a public consultation on its proposals. The 
domains covered by the review are diverse and often technically complex. This Impact 
Assessment therefore aims to inform stakeholder debate on the main issues and options, and 
their implications, in a form accessible to a broad public and decision-making constituency.  
The description of problems and analysis of options and impacts are grouped in six main 
areas, which are closely related to the objectives the regulatory framework seeks to achieve. 
Specifically the Commission has identified a problem in the way that spectrum is managed 
within the EU; current approaches are too rigid and will not allow EU citizens and industry to 
reap the benefits of new wireless products and services. The review exercise has also brought 
to light a number of areas where the current framework could be improved, as described in the 
Commission Staff Working Document associated to the Communication. 
The key players who will be affected by the proposed changes are: 
–  National regulatory authorities, who have responsibility for applying EU rules at the 
national level; and 
–  Operators, service providers, broadcasters and others who may be directly affected by 
changes to the framework. This is not a homogeneous group: its members may often have 
conflicting interests. 
The affected population is every business, society, government department, institution and 
citizen in Europe, since all are users of electronic communications.  
In conformance with the principle of proportionality, this Impact Assessment does not present 
detailed and full quantitative analysis of the possible options at this stage. The analysis will be 
refined in the second report that will provide a more detailed impact assessment on the 
Commission’s legislative proposals for amendment of the Directives (including quantification 
of potential costs and benefits where appropriate). 
3.  CONSULTATION AND EXPERTISE 
The proposals in the Communication draw upon an extensive prior consultation process, 
which has included: 
                                                 
4  See Annex 3 on technological and market evolution.  
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–  Public call for input on the review, which involved a public hearing with over 440 
participants in January 2006, and over 150 written submissions
5; 
–  Discussions with Member States in two High Level meetings with Ministries in September 
2005 and March 2006, and in the Communications Committee and the Radio Spectrum 
Committee; and 
–  Discussion with regulatory authorities, including Radio Spectrum Policy Group, European 
Regulators Group, Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data (‘Article 29 Working Party’).  
In general, the contributors to the call for input considered that the regulatory framework is 
sound and well established. In some areas, however, the views were differing and some 
stakeholders sought far-reaching changes. The results of the public call for input have been 
taken into account in the review and this impact assessment as reflected in the analysis of 
Chapter 5. 
In addition, major sources of information relevant to this impact assessment are the 
Commission Reports on Implementation of the Regulatory Package in general
6, and on the 
market reviews (“Article 7 procedure”) in particular
7; as well as studies and surveys 
commissioned from the external consultants for the review
8. 
In view of the broad scope and the cross-cutting nature of the subject matter at hand, an inter-
service steering group of the Commission services has been established.
9 
Annex 2 provides further details on consultation, expertise and information sources. 
                                                 
5  The contributions are available at:   
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/public_consult/revie
w/index_en.htm 
6  The latest report is the 11
th Implementation Report on European Electronic Communications Regulation 
and Markets 2005, COM(2006)68, available at:   
http://ec.europa.e/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/index_en.htm 
7  Communication on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications, COM(2006) 28, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/article_7/index_en.htm 
8  Preparing the next steps of eCommunications - a contribution to the Review of the eCommunications 
regulatory framework, Hogan & Hartson LLP and Analysys Consulting, 2006; An assessment of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications – growth and investment in the EU 
eCommunications sector, London Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006; and Eurobarometer 
Special – eCommunications household survey, 2006; available at:   
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/studies_ext_consult/i
ndex_en.htm 
9  The following Commission serviced were invited to participate: Secretary-General; Legal Service; 
Competition; Economic and Financial Affairs; Education and Culture; Employment and Social Affairs; 
Energy and Transport; Enlargement; Enterprise and Industry; Health and Consumer Protection; 
Informatics; Internal Market; Justice, Freedom and Security; Regional Policy; Trade; Research; and 
Eurostat.  
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4.  THE OBJECTIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE I2010 INITIATIVE 
The Commission’s “i2010 Initiative: European Information Society 2010”
 adopted in June 
2005
10, set out the contribution of the ICT sector to the EU’s renewed Lisbon strategy to 
stimulate growth, competitiveness and employment. 
The i2010 Initiative builds on three main pillars: 
–  A Single European Information Space offering affordable and secure high bandwidth 
communications, rich and diverse content and digital services. 
–  World class performance in research and innovation in ICT by closing the gap with 
Europe’s leading competitors. 
–  An Information Society that is inclusive, provides high quality public services and 
promotes quality of life. 
i2010 also highlights the importance of spectrum availability to boost innovation in ICT and 
of more flexibility in managing this resource so as to achieve a more efficient use of it.
11 
The regulatory framework for eCommunications falls under the first pillar – the Single 
European Information Space. The review of the regulatory framework provides therefore an 
opportunity to modernise and update the framework to ensure that it supports the i2010 policy 
and the renewed Lisbon Programme. 
More specific objectives of the review are to examine: 
–  the impact of the regulatory framework on investment and growth, and explore alternative 
approaches;  
–  how to improve spectrum management in the EU, and introduce greater flexibility of use; 
–  whether the current model of devolving responsibility to national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), with Community procedures to ensure consistency of approach, are sufficient to 
deliver the i2010 objectives; 
–  how to reduce the administrative burden associated with the market review procedure;  
–  the adequacy of current provisions on consumer protection, in particular those concerning 
universal service; and  
–  how to improve network security. 
                                                 
10 COM(2005)  229,  see:  http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/i2010/index_en.htm 
11  In addition, the Commission Communication on EU spectrum policy priorities for the digital 
switchover in the context of the upcoming ITU Regional Radiocommunication Conference 2006, COM 
(2005)461, sets out the proposed EU strategy aiming to lower the barriers to access radio resources and 
to take advantage of the synergies resulting from a common European approach.  
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eCommunications in the wider economic perspective 
The telecoms sector continues to represent the largest segment by far of the overall European ICT 
sector accounting for 44.4% of the total value in 2005, which is up from 43% a year earlier. In 2005 
the ICT sector was worth €614 billion with telecommunications accounting for €273 billion. Overall 
growth in revenue terms in the sector continues to be strong and again has outpaced general GDP 
growth for the EU which was 1.5%. ICT represents just over 5% of the EU GDP. ICTs drive about 
40% of productivity growth and one quarter of overall growth in Europe. The contribution of the 
telecoms sector to Europe's growth, jobs and prosperity is therefore crucial.
12  
5.  AREAS OF ANALYSIS – OPTIONS AND IMPACTS 
Impact analysis of the review of a package comprising five directives is a complex task. The 
analysis of impacts in this section therefore concentrates on the six objectives listed above. 
The analysis:  
–  focuses on high level and impacts that have the main policy implications;  
–  provides a preliminary, mostly qualitative set of impacts of different options;  
–  addresses impacts on key stakeholders without going into detail; 
–  captures both positive and negative effects of the options; and  
–  prepares the ground for a deeper and more advanced impact analysis at the second stage of 
the review. 
5.1.  Investment and growth 
5.1.1.  The problem 
The regulatory framework aims to create a stable and predictable regulatory environment that 
encourages innovation and stimulate new investment in communications networks and 
services, by both new entrants and existing operators. The question is whether the right 
balance between flexibility and predictability has been found, and to what extent the current 
framework contributes to investment and innovation. 
In the Commission’s ‘call for input’ most incumbent operators and some Ministries 
considered that the regulatory framework should encourage more investment, and called for 
major changes, but this was not the majority view. Some have called for a firm date to be set 
for the withdrawal of sector-specific regulation; other for regulatory holidays for major new 
investments. The arguments put forward for regulatory holidays are based on the large 
investments being made by operators in NGN (Next Generation Networks)
13 core networks 
and fibre local access networks. 
                                                 
12 The  11
th Implementation Report, COM(2006) 68. 
13  On NGN, see Annex 3.  
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5.1.2.  The objective 
The objective is to ensure that the regulatory framework promotes competition investment 
and innovation, which are seen as the best means of ensuring that user needs are met. 
5.1.3.  Policy options  
Option 1 - Remove or restrict sector-specific regulation 
This option of removing or restricting ex ante regulation would focus on creating regulatory 
predictability.  
The advantage of setting a fixed date for withdrawal of sector specific regulation is that it set 
a clear deadline for the removal of ex ante regulation. The disadvantage is that it takes no 
account of the state of competition in the market at the time. Competition progresses at 
different rates in different markets. Removal of ex ante regulation in a market where an 
incumbent operator retains its dominant position is likely to prohibit the development of 
sustainable competition and to cause consumer harm. 
The investments needed for network modernisation are substantial, but the fact that 
investments in NGN represent large capital outlays is not in itself justification for regulatory 
forbearance, since the operational savings from rationalisation and the use of modern 
technology are also considerable.
14 
In the case of fibre local access networks, comparison is often made with the United States 
where regulated access to new fibre investment by telecommunications operators is the 
exception. In this connection, it is worth pointing out the differences between the EU and the 
USA. In the United States, relatively few subscribers use xDSL (Digital Subscriber Line) 
technology due to the length of the copper loops, so the telecommunication companies are the 
minority player in the broadband market, which is dominated by cable (TV) companies - the 
opposite of the situation in Europe (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. DSL and cable markets shares in the United States and the EU 
USA
38%
55%
7%
DSL
Cable
Other 
EU 25
80
20
DSL
Cable & Other
 
Source: OECD, European Commission 
                                                 
14  For example, BT has announced it will have invested £10 billion by the end of the decade on its 21CN 
initiative, and claims that “21CN will completely transform BT’s networks reducing complexity and 
radically reducing BT’s cost base with identified savings of around one billion pounds a year by 2008 / 
09”. BT Press release DC06-109, 6.3.2006.  
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A counter example can be found in Japan, where significant investment in fibre is also taking 
place, despite the incumbent (NTT) having an obligation to offer unbundled access to its 
fibre. The main driver for this investment is intense local competition (in particular with 
electricity utilities) and strong evidence of demand for more bandwidth among consumers
15. 
Option 2 – Adopt an ‘open access’ model for new network infrastructure  
Today, structural separation cannot be imposed under the current directives, but could in 
principle be imposed under competition law instruments. Under this option, Member States 
would be required to grant the NRAs the powers to ensure that the infrastructure provider is 
providing non-discriminatory access to all operators by separating infrastructure provision 
from service provision to a greater or lesser extent. 
The ‘open access’ model for new infrastructure investment works well in a greenfield 
situation, where there is no pre-existing network. Thus, for example, the Commission 
Guidelines on criteria and modalities of implementation of structural funds in support of 
electronic communications
16 recommend this approach. The model offers complete 
predictability (in that the access rules are known from the start) and can be attractive to 
investors prepared to accept low returns over a long period (as opposed to the high returns and 
short periods typical of the services sector). 
It is more complex to introduce an open access model in the existing local access network 
where the incumbent already owns the infrastructure (ducts and poles, as well as the copper).  
The general view, as confirmed by two OECD reports
17, is that complete structural separation 
is rarely justified in the communications sector. Overall, the costs of structural separation 
appear to be greater than the expected benefits, in particular due to the fact that even after 
structural separation, regulation of the independent local loop operator remains necessary to 
prevent monopoly pricing. Other disadvantages concern the adequate level of investment in 
network infrastructure when providers do not receive the revenues and consequent incentives 
that flow from vertical integration. Experience in other sectors (e.g. railways) has shown the 
problems of co-ordinating investment when infrastructure and services are separated. This 
problem is more acute in the communications industry, where technological change is rapid 
and where investment demands are pressing.  
Option 3 – No change to the regulatory framework  
The current framework is based on regulation of markets. This market based approach is a 
response to convergence; it allows inter-platform competition to be fully taken into account, 
and avoids the technology-specific regulation. The same regulatory principles apply 
regardless of which kind of existing or potentially new technology is involved. Regulation can 
be lifted when sufficient investment has taken place to create effective competition.  
                                                 
15  See ‘The Business Case for Incumbent Telco Fibre Networks’, prepared by Heavy Reading for the 
Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) Council Europe, January 2006:   
http://www.europeftthcouncil.com/extra/Market_Development/FTTH_Council_Incumbent_Exec_Sum
m.pdf 
16  SEC(2003) 895, 28.7.2003. 
17  DAFFE/COMP/WP2 “The benefits and costs of structural separation” – Note by TISP, of 10.01.2003 
and DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)10 “Draft Report to Council on experiences with structural separation” of 
28.10.2005.  
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On the other hand, NRAs have already now a margin of manoeuvre to adapt the remedies to 
market failures concerned. For example, in one Member State duct sharing has been imposed 
on the incumbent. This remedy has been proposed in some responses to the ‘call for input’. It 
addresses the real cost of installing a local access network, which is not the cost of the fibre, 
but the cost and time it takes to be granted rights of way and to dig up roads and pavements to 
lay ducts. In practice, however, other NRAs may only be able to follow this approach in 
situations where ducts have been installed relatively recently and are not congested
18. 
This option therefore implies that ex ante regulation should not be removed “en bloc” but 
progressively as an outcome of market analysis, while further efforts are made to foster 
consistency in remedies applied by NRAs (see Chapter 5.3 below).  
Studies show that the level of investment in the sector in Europe over recent years has been at 
least as high, if not higher, than in other regions. On the other hand, it is found that slow 
implementation of regulatory reform and poor application of the framework holds back 
investment.
19 The Commission Staff Working Document associated to the Communication 
describes the flexibility available to NRAs under the framework for dealing with new and 
emerging markets.  
Recent trends in investments 
In 2005, aggregate investment – measured in terms of capital expenditure - rose to more than € 45 
billion, representing an increase of 6% over 2004.
20 It was the third consecutive year of increased year-
over-year investment levels since 2003. The steady nature of this overall increase suggests that the 
investment cycle has improved and that the sector is considered a more attractive growth opportunity 
because of its broader structural characteristics. Moreover renewed emphasis on investment was 
accompanied by rising capital market valuations of the sector over time.
21 
5.1.4.  Comparison of options and impacts 
Option 1 (limitation of ex ante regulation) is favoured by incumbents and opposed by new 
entrants. It is not clear that on its own it would lead to more investment, and it carries a strong 
risk of reducing competition and causing consumer harm. 
Option 2 (‘open access’ model) is favoured by new entrants and opposed by incumbents. 
Structural separation represents a major intervention into the property rights of infrastructure 
owners. It is not clear that it will lead to more investment, because it denies the infrastructure 
owner the revenue streams that are available to a vertically integrated operator. In addition it 
implies never-ending regulation of the infrastructure provider. 
                                                 
18  Some ducts are 30-40 years old, are in a poor state of repair and congested with cables. 
19  See further details in the Commission Staff Working Document associated with the Communication and 
in particular the study Growth and Investment in the EU e-Communications Sector, London Economics 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006. 
20 The  11
th Implementation Report, COM(2006) 68. Data from Infonetics Research, ECTA, ETNO, 
ECCA, OECD and the European Commission sources (ECTA: European Competitive 
Telecommunications Association, ETNO: European Telecommunications Network Operators' 
Association; ECCA: European Cable Communications Association).  
21  The benchmark Dow Jones EURO STOXX (SM) Telecommunications (SXKE) – encompassing mainly 
incumbent operators - rose from 321.73 on 1 Jan 2003 to 417.11 on 1 Dec 2005 (approximately 30%). 
Sector performance in 2005 alone was more disappointing, though.  
EN  13     EN 
Option 3 (maintain the current model) is supported by certain empirical evidence, which 
reinforces the conclusion that competition drives investment, and that slow implementation of 
regulatory reform (and poor application of the framework) holds back investment. The 
framework has the flexibility to handle new and volatile markets, and has the tools for 
regulators to take account of the need for risky investments to generate an adequate return on 
capital when mandating pro-competitive access obligations. Duct sharing is possible under the 
current framework and does offer advantages in certain situations. 
See Annex 4 for the summary tables on main likely impacts arising from the each of the three 
policy options. 
The Commission considers that option 3 is the most appropriate option and has proposed this 
in the associated Communication. 
5.2.  Radio spectrum 
5.2.1.  The Problem 
The importance of radio spectrum as a production factor for electronic communications 
services and networks (such as mobile, wireless and satellite communications, TV and radio 
broadcasting) and other applications (short range devices, defence, transport, radio location 
and GPS/Galileo satellite system) has increased dramatically during the last decade
22. It is 
estimated that the total value of radio spectrum dependent services in the EU is in excess of 
200 € billion, i.e. between 2 % and 2.5 % of annual European gross product.
23 
Since most spectrum throughout the EU is already allocated to some usage or users, any new 
allocation can only be made at the expense of existing uses or users
24. The need to balance the 
demands of very different sectors constitutes a challenge to any spectrum regulator. Spectrum 
policy must take into account not only the needs of electronic communications, but all other 
spectrum uses, including research, aeronautical, maritime, space, audio visual (content), 
defence industry, earth observation, medical, inclusion, road safety, scientific, etc. This 
balance is often more effectively sought at EU level, since policies competing for radio 
spectrum are increasingly developed and agreed for the European Union as a whole. 
This raises the issue of efficient management of the whole spectrum at EU level. A better 
coordination of spectrum management along binding common rules needs to be considered. 
The first results achieved on the basis of the Radio Spectrum Decision
25, and the possibility to 
reach consensus on strategic spectrum issues through the Radio Spectrum Policy Group, as 
well as the experiences from the application to radio equipment of the Radio and 
                                                 
22  For further discussion on radio spectrum, see Study on conditions and options in introducing secondary 
trading of radio spectrum in the European Community, Analysys Consulting, DotEcon, Hogan & 
Hartson, 2004, and Study on spectrum management in the field of broadcasting, Aegis Systems Ltd, 
Indepen Consulting Ltd and IDATE, 2004. 
23  See the above cited study by Analysys et al. The estimate covers the European Economic Area, i.e. all 
EU Member States and Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein. 
24  The alternative is for new services to be given "virgin" spectrum at increasingly higher frequencies, 
which can however substantially increase the cost of new systems  
25  Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community, OJL 108 of 24.4.2002, 
p.1.  
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Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive (R&TT&E Directive 1999/5/EC) already 
contribute to the development of a European dimension for radio spectrum policy.  
The overall question to be addressed here is whether the current mechanisms are capable and 
sufficiently efficient to deliver satisfactory results or whether there is need for change to 
ensure more coherence in the spectrum management specifically for electronic 
communication services.  
Provisions concerning radio spectrum management for electronic communication services 
exist within the present regulatory framework. However there are several developments that 
show that current spectrum management approaches are not able to meet the potential market 
demand for spectrum: 
–  Currently radio spectrum remains rigidly segmented between classical services (broadcast, 
fixed communications, mobile communications). Rapid technological development in 
combination with the digitalisation of transmission as well as the convergence of 
communication services has blurred the link between radio access platforms and the 
services on which spectrum management was traditionally based. 
–  In the context of the growing internal market and global trade flows for wireless services 
and equipment, national borders are increasingly irrelevant for optimal radio spectrum use. 
Mobile telephone equipment manufacturers and operators increasingly have to think and 
act globally to benefit from economies of scale and remain competitive. Fragmentation of 
the management of access rights to spectrum is not conducive to these general industrial 
trends, since it limits investment across the EU and stifles innovation. 
–  Due to their physical characteristics there is a high demand for radio resources below 3 
GHz. For historical reasons, these bands are often used by long-established sectors (e.g. for 
broadcasting, transport or defence purposes), which do not make optimal use of spectrum 
efficiency gains generated by new technology.  
–  There are strikingly diverging conditions to access radio resources between incumbent 
users (notably between broadcasters vs. mobile operators) while the services provided by 
both increasingly overlap. The resulting constraints create very large discrepancies in 
demand and economic valuations with regards to similar spectrum bands
26. 
                                                 
26  It is generally agreed that the high prices paid at the 3G mobile auctions set back the large-scale 
deployment of 3G services by several years. The choice of operators to bid was, however, influenced by 
the offer of a specific limited numbers of licenses and the assumption by bidders that no further 
spectrum would become available. The bid calculations were therefore based on a combination of 
assumed spectrum value and the perceived value of an oligopolistic position with the latter driving up 
the bids over any spectrum value. See the above cited study by Analysys et al. for more discussion on 
3G auctions.  
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–  Incentives for investing in efficient radio resources usage vary greatly amongst spectrum 
users
27. Service providers which are established in the market typically use mature 
technology, and may have less incentive to upgrade to more efficient state of the art 
technology that could free spectrum for competing players. Access to available spectrum to 
new and innovative applications is often in consequence only available in higher, less 
attractive frequencies, which in turn often limits the viability of the business cases of new 
services. Today, it is increasingly impossible to accommodate new services or technologies 
since as a result of legacy assignment there is no "empty" spectrum in large parts of 
Europe
28.  
–  Technological innovation, such as the introduction of effective "cognitive" technologies, 
may in time significantly reduce the risk of interference between different spectrum users, 
reducing the need for granting exclusive access to spectrum resources and allowing a more 
extensive application of general authorisations incorporating light technical spectrum 
usage constraints. The application of these innovative technologies could thereby lower 
access barriers to spectrum and increase its efficient use. 
–  Legacy issues dating back to the way spectrum was originally awarded, such as the 
conditions and pricing of the original licences, can constrain the ability of market players 
to compete on an equal footing in a wider, less restrictive electronic communications 
services market.  
–  Fragmentation in decision-making, where successive or parallel entities adopt different 
rules or interpretations, creates uncertainty among operators and may impede consistent 
delivery of services. 
The current regulatory framework establishes general principles for spectrum management for 
electronic communications which are difficult to apply correctly in practice
29. Consequently, 
there is sometimes a lack of coherence at EU level in the optimal utilisation of the radio 
spectrum resource. The mismatch between regulation and market requirements in wireless 
communication services impairs the efficient use of spectrum. Furthermore, burdensome and 
lengthy administrative decisions constitute a hurdle for market players. The resulting 
inefficiencies in the distribution and use of spectrum create costs, lead to wasted opportunities 
for business and reduce the take-up of innovative services and products to the detriment of 
consumers. In addition, it may prevent economies of scale in the EU and push innovation 
outside Europe to other regions where spectrum necessary to access large markets can be 
obtained more quickly and effectively. 
                                                 
27  For example, mobile operators, who are generally recognised to be efficient users of spectrum, are 
making very large investments into infrastructure to further improve their spectrum efficiency. On the 
other hand, terrestrial distribution of television, which has access to a similar amount of spectrum, 
leaves much of it unused in any given location. Without entering into a debate on the comparative 
benefits of these two services, there is a serious question whether the global cost of investment in 
infrastructure and spectrum for services is optimal from the perspective of EU growth and development 
as a whole. 
28  This lack of available spectrum does not reveal the actual usage of spectrum. Recent studies by 
OFCOM and FCC demonstrate that even in highly-congested urban environments, the use of spectrum 
is largely sub-optimal, except for some mobile services. 
29  With the exception of the coordination of technical radio spectrum usage conditions which already 
today can be coordinated pursuant to the Radio Spectrum Decision and equipment regulation under the 
R&TTE Directive.  
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5.2.2.  The Objective  
Improving the way radio spectrum is managed to optimise it usage will require adapting the 
current spectrum management mechanisms. For this purpose, it is essential to anchor more 
firmly within the regulatory framework provisions aiming at maximising the social and 
economic benefits of radio resources and to allow for the synergy of a coherent EU approach. 
The fundamental objectives are: 
–  to facilitate access to radio resources for market players; although no single approach 
is likely to fit all situations, the baseline approach remains that spectrum usage conditions 
should be enshrined within general authorisations, as stipulated by the regulatory 
framework. It is proposed that individual licensing should only be allowed on the basis of a 
clear justification that the risk of harmful interference cannot be managed other then by 
attributing individual rights, Where individual rights are applied, the aim is to be least 
restrictive in the prerogative to exploit and dispose of these individual rights and to shift 
from administrative decisions towards a market-based approach;  
–  to give spectrum usage right holders substantially more freedom to exert these rights in 
terms of choice of radio network and access technologies used as well as services offered; 
this implies ensuring technology and service neutrality when defining spectrum usage 
rights; and 
–  to ensure that there is a coordinated approach to spectrum management at EU level 
amongst Member States where the internal market for electronic communications services 
depends significantly on radio spectrum. This would include the possibility of agreeing 
common authorisation conditions in appropriate cases.  
These measures aim to respond more efficiently to the actual needs of the market, while 
seeking to achieve an appropriate coordination where required for the internal market.  
5.2.3.  Policy options  
The options described below build on prior analysis made by the Commission in its 
Communications: A Forward Looking Spectrum Policy
30 and A Market Based Approach to 
Spectrum Management
31. Considering the objectives and challenges to secure more efficient 
use of spectrum in the Community through better spectrum management, three main options 
may be envisaged:  
–  Option 1: Create an EU entity (e.g. an agency) in charge of managing EU aspects of 
spectrum. 
–  Option 2: Adapt and improve the regulatory framework while keeping existing institutional 
arrangements; coherence at EU level would be achieved through regulatory committee 
structures to coordinate actions and establish common rules. 
–  Option 3: Aim at increasing the efficiency of spectrum management by continuing to work 
on the basis of the existing regulatory framework. 
                                                 
30 COM(2005)  411. 
31 COM(2005)  400.  
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The following discussion of options cover the introduction of flexibility and the reduction of 
obstacles to access to radio spectrum resources through the use of general authorisations and 
the introduction of a market-based is approach.  
The three options need to be envisaged in the context of the continuous application of the 
Radio Spectrum Decision in its present form which already provides for some harmonisation 
of the technical use of spectrum, and of the R&TT&E Directive which harmonises 
requirements on radio equipment, both aiming at improving the functioning of the internal 
market.  
Option 1 – Create an EU entity (e.g. an agency) in charge of managing EU aspects of 
spectrum  
Under this option, an entity at EU level, e.g. an agency, would be vested with the power to 
adopt regulation applicable throughout the European Union covering certain aspects of 
spectrum related to EU policies, such as the use of general authorisations, the introduction of 
a market-based approach and the authorisation of services with a European scope. 
Responsibilities for applying the provisions would remain at the national level, as well as 
issues such as monitoring, enforcement and border coordination. 
Provisions in the revised regulatory framework would establish the principle that radio 
spectrum for electronic communications be governed by technology and service neutrality, 
whereby users would be free to introduce the technology and services they consider most 
appropriate.  
Option 2 - Adapt the regulatory framework and improve coordination at EU level through 
wider use of committee mechanisms 
This option seeks to strengthen the internal market by improving the efficient use of spectrum 
through targeted changes to the regulatory framework, while retaining the existing 
institutional arrangements. This option would enable increased flexibility through common 
agreement at the European level to limit regulatory restrictions to the minimum, achieved via 
comitology decisions, while retaining the role of the national regulators in implementing and 
applying such a framework. 
Provisions in the revised regulatory framework would establish the principle that radio 
spectrum for electronic communications be governed by technology and service neutrality, 
whereby users would be free to introduce the technology and services they consider as most 
appropriate.  
Where general authorisations are not possible, comitology decisions could designate exclusive 
spectrum usage rights in certain bands as tradable in all Member States, pursuant to a general 
provision introduced in the Framework and Authorisation directives. In those cases, market 
mechanisms would replace administrative decision making for the assignment of spectrum. 
Exceptions to such spectrum trading would have to be limited in time and scope and duly 
justified.   
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Option 3 - No change to the regulatory framework 
Although the current framework is a light regime with general authorisations for the provision 
of services as a principle and the granting of exclusive individual rights as the exception, in 
practice the current choice in spectrum management is to subject most bands systematically to 
individual rights. There is presently no mechanism to ensure a coherent designation of bands 
where the use of spectrum is subject to general authorisation only or to ensure a coherent and 
certain introduction of trading of spectrum rights.  
The principle of technology neutrality is not clearly defined and no coherent application can 
be ensured between Member States. Although general authorisations are foreseen under the 
current framework, implying a service neutral approach, the current practice does not in many 
cases reflect this. 
Spectrum usage rights can and usually are subject to conditions which designate the service 
for which the right has been granted. Under the current framework, harmonisation of 
conditions attached to individual spectrum rights cannot be done with binding force
32. 
The provision
33 in the present regulatory framework relating to the authorisation of pan-
European services and the common selection of rights holders is weak.  
The current principles applicable to spectrum allocation are succinctly listed in the 
Framework Directive and no clear procedural obligations apply to allocation of spectrum. 
These decisions directly influence spectrum assignment, which is subject to specific 
procedures. 
Total coherence between objectives of equipment standardisation under the Radio and 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive and spectrum management cannot be 
ensured. 
The current framework may not be sufficient to fully coordinate the publication of 
information regarding rights and obligations in order to support the introduction of spectrum 
trading in a coordinated way. 
5.2.4.  Comparison of options and impacts 
Option 1 (create an EU entity/agency in charge of managing EU aspects of spectrum) could 
achieve a high level of harmonisation, higher efficiency in the internal market and more 
streamlined decision-making. A European-level entity could adopt decisions speedily and, 
where pan-European authorisations are concerned, with consistent applicability. It could, 
however, be argued that the concept of an EU entity covering spectrum in general goes 
beyond the scope of the present review, and changing the organisational structure of European 
spectrum management could require substantial time and resources. 
Option 2 (wider application of committee mechanisms to improve coordination at EU level) 
builds on the existing cooperation between Member States and the Commission. Compared to 
the existing situation, it would lead to a more consistent set of rules within the EU and a 
greater consideration of the European dimension. The central role of national administrations 
                                                 
32  Art 19 Framework Directive. 
33  Art 8 Authorisation Directive.  
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in the common decision-making would ensure that their concerns form part of the input. 
Consistency in application between the European and the national levels would also be 
strengthened. The transitions of markets for services from national to cross-border or pan-
European would be encouraged and supported. This option also safeguards the existing 
technical expertise at the national level. Inevitably this parallel system means however some 
duplication of activities already carried out in the Member States and could delay the decision 
process.  
Option 3 (no change): Keeping the rules covering the current mix of spectrum management 
mechanisms (i.e. dominant national administrative model, voluntary trading and general 
authorisations) would not ensure the efficient use of the spectrum in the EU and would risk 
further fragmenting the use of the spectrum in Europe, as national reform processes of varied 
extent and scope are under way in the Member States. It could have substantial negative 
effects for the strengthening of the internal market and for the competitiveness of Europe vis-
à-vis other world regions. Voluntary cooperation between authorities cannot guarantee 
coherence of solutions. 
Both Options 1 and 2 would allow for the introduction of more flexible use of spectrum 
including spectrum trading and greater use of unlicensed bands. Under these options, 
spectrum users would assume greater responsibility for coordination amongst themselves and 
interference management. 
See Annex 4 for the summary tables on main likely impacts arising from the each of the three 
policy options. 
The Commission considers that Option 2 is the most appropriate and has proposed this in the 
associated Communication.  
5.3.  Regulatory models and the Internal market  
5.3.1.  The Problem 
The regulatory model in the current framework has two sides. On the one side, it devolves 
regulation of markets to national regulatory authorities on the grounds that they are closest to 
their markets and therefore placed to regulate them. On the other side, in order to avoid the 
fragmentation that such decentralisation could bring, it gives the Commission power to ensure 
consistency of national regulatory authorities’ measures in certain well-defined areas, namely 
the markets to be regulated and operators to be regulated on those markets. 
Market players continue to complain about differences in approach of NRAs in different 
countries, and point to the increased cost for business of handling 25 different regulatory 
approaches. 
5.3.2.  The Objective 
The objective is to find the best model for delivering a single market in eCommunications, in 
the light of the prevailing political and institutional context.  
EN  20     EN 
5.3.3.  Policy options  
Option 1 - A single European regulatory body  
A European regulator acting outside the domestic politics of all Member States would remove 
the national influences that sometimes colour many decisions of NRAs, and could be 
expected to lead to greater consistency of regulation within the internal market. Operators 
active in several Member States would not have to deal with several national authorities and 
differences in implementation. 
Several variations of a European Regulator can be identified: 
–  a central authority replacing the NRAs; 
–  a centrally-managed but geographically-dispersed authority, with the existing NRAs being 
subsumed into a European Regulatory authority, and in effect becoming the local offices of 
the European regulator; local offices might have some limited power for local decision-
making (e.g. in areas such as rights of way); 
–  a ‘European Central Bank’ model, whereby the NRAs would remain as independent 
entities, but would be obliged to act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions 
issued by the European regulator; and 
–  a European regulator that acted as an appeals body for decisions taken by national 
regulators, but without power to instruct an individual NRA in advance of a decision. 
Other variations would confine a European regulator to dealing only with cross border issues. 
Option 2 - Maintain the decentralised model but strengthen the Commission’s role to achieve 
internal market objective in selected areas 
The option of maintaining the existing decentralised regulatory model but strengthening the 
role for the Commission role to achieve internal market objectives in selected areas would 
mean a step back from the idea of a centrally managed European regulatory authority and 
would focus on strengthening harmonisation measures in a number of areas. The main areas 
are discussed below; other areas are listed in Chapter 5.7. 
Commission veto on remedies: The Article 7 procedure (see Chapter 5.4 below) allows the 
Commission to “veto” market definition and assessment of SMP (significant market power) 
notified by the NRAs. However, the Commission has no veto power on remedies, only a 
possibility to comment. A Commission power to veto certain proposed remedies could 
contribute to more harmonised approach across the EU.  
Commission approval of actions taken by NRAs with regard to access and interconnection 
(Art 5(1) of the Access Directive): Article 5(1) of the Access Directive empowers NRAs to 
impose obligations, under certain conditions, on non-SMP undertakings in order to ensure 
adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services. Unlike other obligations 
that can be imposed on companies by the NRAs, these obligations can be imposed without 
conducting market analysis. In order to avoid over-regulation and a fragmentation of the 
Internal market by the imposition of inconsistent obligations under this article, the 
Commission could be given the possibility to veto NRA measures taken in this area.  
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It should be noted that some of the other proposals listed under Chapter 5.7 would also give 
the Commission the ability to adopt technical implementing measures under a committee 
procedure, but this is already foreseen in the current framework and they do not imply any 
fundamental change in the regulatory model. 
Option 3 – No change to the regulatory framework 
This option would maintain the status quo. It would be open to the NRAs to strengthen their 
cooperation in the European Regulators Group (ERG, which is composed of the heads of the 
national regulatory authorities
34), and to develop common EU wide approaches to common 
problems.  
5.3.4.  Comparison of options and impacts 
Option 1 (a single European regulator) could achieve a high level of harmonisation in the 
internal market. However, a central European authority replacing NRAs or centrally-managed 
European authority would represent a dramatic change of the current regulatory system, 
resulting in a complete centralisation of electronic communications regulation at the EU level.  
For these reasons, it is a sensitive issue from a political perspective, because it would entail 
transfer of powers over electronic communications regulation to a supra-national body. There 
would be a strong national resistance to the fact that a trans-national body was regulating 
domestic issues. Depending on the precise institutional structure, a European regulator could 
in some cases represent another layer of regulation which would increase the overall 
administrative burden.  
The European regulator for telecommunications / electronic communications has been 
discussed on previous occasions and in both cases was rejected by Member States. There is no 
reason to suppose that the present political climate is any more conducive to this concept than 
in the past. 
The option of a European regulator may offer the best prospects for creating a truly single 
market in eCommunications, but until Europe had truly pan-European electronic services, it is 
unlikely that a pan-European regulator will be justified. 
Option 2 (strengthened role for the Commission to achieve internal market objectives) is 
consistent with the i2010 policy of creating a single European information space. It would 
lead to a more consistent set of rules within the EU, and would improve the situation for 
companies doing business in several Member States. It does however involve some transfer of 
responsibility from NRAs to the Commission, for example by enabling the Commission to 
veto decisions on remedies.  
Option 3 (no change) avoids any renegotiation of the balance of responsibility between the 
Commission and Member States. To date the NRAs have tended to emphasise their 
independence, and have been reluctant to limit their freedom of action in pursuit of 
harmonised European-wide solutions. It is not certain that NRAs could deliver the consistent 
regulatory practices that are demanded by market players.  
                                                 
34 See:  http://erg.eu.int  
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See Annex 4 for the summary tables on main likely impacts arising from the each of the three 
policy options. 
The Commission considers that option 2 is the most appropriate and has proposed this in the 
associated Communication.  
5.4.  Market review procedures 
5.4.1.  The Problem 
Experience with implementation of the framework has shown that the procedures associated 
with market analysis (the so-called ‘Article 7 procedure’
35) could be streamlined. The 
working of Article 7 mechanism was analysed in Commission’s progress report published in 
February 2006.
36 
Under the regulatory framework, the independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs) must 
define their national eCommunications markets on the basis of competition law – starting 
from a list of 18 markets pre-established by the Commission Recommendation on Relevant 
Markets
37 - and to assess whether the markets identified are characterised by the presence of 
at least one operator with significant market power (“SMP”). If these markets are found not to 
be competitive, then they are subject to ex-ante regulation, in order to stimulate competition.  
The main aspects of the current procedures that govern the amount of work for NRAs are 
(a)  the number of markets to be analysed, and 
(b)  the level of detailed required for every market analysis and subsequent 
notification to the Commission.
38 
5.4.2.  The Objective  
Based on the Commission and stakeholder experience, this section examines how to achieve 
least burdensome and the most effective way of dealing with market analysis and notification, 
i.e. Article 7 procedure. The objective is therefore, in line with simplification and better 
regulation principles, to simplify market analysis and notification. 
                                                 
35  Article 7 of the Framework Directive. 
36  Communication on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications COM(2006) 28 available at:   
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/article_7/index_en.htm#communication%20art7 
Member States began using the Article 7 notification procedure in August 2003. By mid-January 2006, 
the Commission received 334 notifications from 20 Member States. In all cases, the Commission 
assessed the notifications within the Article 7 deadlines of 1 month and required an extra 2 months 
when it had serious doubts as to the compatibility of the proposed measures with Community law. By 
the same time, the Commission had issued a total of 198 decisions. The Commission is expecting many 
more notifications to come, possibly reaching 500 notifications by the end of 2006. 
37  OJ L114, 08.05.2003, p. 45. 
38  The administrative costs relating to Article 7 procedure will be assessed, where appropriate, in the 
second impact assessment report of this review.  
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5.4.3.  Policy options  
The following options suggest possible ways of simplification of the Article 7 procedure. 
They present different ways of achieving the objective of less burdensome regulation but they 
have to be seen in relation to the other objectives/ themes of the review.  
Option 1 - Remove Article 7 notification procedure 
Regulation could be left entirely to Member States without any oversight and “control” from 
the Commission. NRAs might still find it necessary to carry out market reviews but they 
would no longer have to inform the Commission.  
More radical approaches such as abolishing sector specific regulation or having a European 
regulator, as discussed in Chapter 5.3.3 above, would also entail removal of the Article 7 
procedure.  
Option 2 - Relax notification requirements for Article 7 procedure  
This option supposes that the current regulatory framework will remain in place but with 
improvements in the way in which it is implemented. By 2009/2010, NRAs in all 25 Member 
States will have conducted at least two and possibly three market reviews under the current 
notification procedure of Article 7 of the Framework Directive. Based on experience, some 
streamlining of the procedures could be contemplated. 
NRAs would still be obliged to conduct market reviews and undertake national and European 
consultations but for certain market analyses and notifications the current level of detail 
would no longer be required; similarly to the European Merger Control Regime, a simplified 
procedure would be introduced that could apply to the following categories of cases: 
–  notifications of markets which had been found competitive in the first review, unless either 
substantial changes in competitive conditions had occurred since the former review; and 
–  notifications where only minor changes to a previous notification were involved (such as 
the details of a remedy). 
For cases falling under the simplified procedure, a standard notification form could be 
established that would limit the information required to the minimum so as to reduce 
significantly the administrative burden for NRAs, operators and the Commission. In such 
cases, in exceptional circumstances, if the Commission detected serious problems with the 
measures under consultation, it could still require the measure to be notified in extenso. Also, 
in the case of Member States that had recently joined the EU, the Commission would 
routinely require a first complete round of market analysis to be notified in extenso. 
Option 3 - No change to the regulatory framework 
The ‘do nothing’ option implies not taking legislative measures, but action could be taken by 
NRAs under the existing legislation to address some of the problems identified in this section. 
The European Regulators Group (ERG) has the possibility of addressing the problems raised 
in this section by improving coordination between NRAs and providing more precise 
guidance on appropriate remedies (e.g. through revision of the ERG Common Position on 
remedies).  
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5.4.4.  Comparison of options and impacts 
Option 1 (remove Article 7 notification procedure) reduces the administrative workload on 
NRAs but risks much greater diversity of regulatory practices in the different Member States, 
and could have a significant negative impact on the Internal Market. It fundamentally alters 
the regulatory model of the framework, which combines decentralised regulation by NRAs 
with coordination by the Commission to ensure consistency in key areas.  
Option 2 (relax notification requirements for Article 7 procedure) offers ways to streamline 
the Article 7 procedure without losing the benefits of coordination. It offers some reduction in 
administrative workload, but not as much as in the first option. It maintains the overall 
regulatory model of the framework. 
Option 3 of doing nothing is not in line with the better regulation policy of the Commission, 
since it maintains all the current administrative procedures when experience shows that they 
could be reduced. 
See Annex 4 for the summary tables on main likely impacts arising from the each of the three 
policy options. 
The Commission considers that the option 2 is the most appropriate one. 
5.5.  Consumer Protection and Universal Service  
5.5.1.  The Problem 
A central goal of the regulatory framework is to deliver substantial consumer benefits, and to 
do this in the context of an inclusive Information Society. The regulatory framework relies in 
large part on enhanced competition to provide choice, innovative services and value for 
money to consumers while the provision of universal service is one of two mechanisms that 
complement a competition-based approach to satisfying the needs of end-users and protecting 
consumers’ rights.  
Telecom liberalisation and consumers 
In the 1980s traditional telecoms monopolies controlled all forms of telecommunications – voice and 
data. Starting with handsets in 1988 and progressively adding services until 1998, the EU liberalised 
all telecoms services. Operators began entering each others’ markets, new entrants invested in services 
and infrastructure. On average, for the same telecoms services, consumers spent almost 24% less in 
2005 than in 1996. When taking into account the general evolution of prices in the economy as relative 
prices (i.e. corrected for the evolution of the harmonised consumer price index) prices went down 
about 35% in 1996-2005
39 
In 2005 the Commission conducted the review of the scope of universal service according to 
the criteria set by the Universal Service Directive, and concluded that market developments 
did not justify extending the scope to mobile communications or high-speed/broadband 
internet access. The Communication of May 2005 also sought public comment on several 
questions with longer-term implications for universal service provision, which stimulated a 
                                                 
39  Annex to the Commission Staff Working Paper, Horizontal evaluation of the performance of network 
industries providing services of general economic interest, SEC(2005)1781, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/internal_market/economic-reports/index_en.htm  
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wide range of different reactions. In general, the responses indicated acceptance of the need to 
change the universal service provision in the long term, but a hesitation to make immediate 
changes.
40 
The Commission has identified several detailed areas where consumer rights can be 
improved, as set out in the Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the 
communication, and it is not intended to analyse these in detail at this stage. The main 
political question is whether the 20
th century concept of universal service remains valid in the 
21
st century.
41 
5.5.2.  Policy options and next steps for Universal service 
The options range from removing the provision of universal service completely, and relying 
instead on horizontal consumer protection legislation to protect users, or going in the opposite 
direction and expanding the scope of universal service and use it to meet social goals other 
than those for which it is currently designed. Closely associated with the question of the scope 
of universal service is the question of finance – should the cost of universal service be borne 
by the state or by the sector players? 
In view of the fundamental nature of these questions, the Commission considers that a broad 
consultation is necessary, one that needs more time than is available in the current review of 
the Directives. The Commission therefore proposes to issue a Green Paper on Universal 
service in 2007 to allow for a wide ranging public debate on the issues. This could in turn lead 
to further legislative proposals in 2008. 
Further impact analysis will be undertaken in the course of this future consultation exercise. 
5.6.  Security 
5.6.1.  The Problem 
Society is becoming more and more aware of how essential modern electronic 
communications networks and services are for everyday life, in business or at home. Security 
is not only important for the sector itself but also for all other sectors which increasingly rely 
on ICT.  
                                                 
40  See the Communication of May 2005, COM(2005) 203 and the Communication of April 2006, 
COM(2006) 163, the latter of which reports the outcome of the review and summarises the results of 
the public consultation:   
http://eceuropa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/communic_reports/in
dex_en.htm. The Impact Assessment Report (SEC(2006)445 that accompanies COM(2006) 163 is 
available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/commiss_serv_doc/i
ndex_en.htm 
41  On the regulatory discussion see, for example, Rethinking universal service for a next generation 
network environment, OECD, 2006 (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)5/FINAL), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/48/36503873.pdf; Universal Service in an IP-enabled NGN 
Environment, Patrick Xavier, 2006 (a background paper for a ITU workshop on 23-24 March 2006) 
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ngn/event-march-2006.phtml; Universal Service Obligations and 
Broadband, OECD, 2003 (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)4/FINAL); and the special issues of 
Telecommunications Policy Vol. 28, Numbers 3/4, April/May 2004, pp. 237-357.  
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In the electronic communications sector, the impact of the EU competition driven policy and 
technological developments have produced substantial benefits for consumers in terms of both 
choice and innovation including in the development of security products and services. 
However, the market appears to have failed so far to sufficiently address security problems, 
which was also expressed in the ‘call for input’. In today’s electronic communications 
environment, one weak link affects the integrity of the whole system. 
Market and technology developments have resulted in more players being involved in 
electronic communications, and the trend towards internet protocol (IP) means that networks 
are in general more open than in the past. The growth of spam, viruses, spyware and other 
forms of malware, which is undermining users’ confidence in electronic communications, is 
partly due to that openness.
42 
The Commission Communication “A strategy for a Secure Information Society – Dialogue, 
partnership and empowerment”  of 30 May 2006 (COM(2006) 251)
43 sets out a general 
strategy ranging from technology, self-regulation, to awareness and international cooperation. 
This section focuses on the need to provide an adequate, legal framework to protect citizens 
and businesses using electronic communications.
44 
5.6.2.  The Objective 
The objective is to strengthen and extend existing provisions on security and network 
integrity, thereby also highlighting the importance of the subject in a competitive and fast 
moving technological environment.  
5.6.3.  Policy options  
Option 1 - Introduce detailed new provisions on security and integrity  
This option would be to introduce detailed new provisions on security and integrity to solve 
the problems outlined above. EU legislation would impose detailed technical and 
organisational obligations for providers of electronic communications networks and/or 
services, such as obligations to: 
–  implement and maintain security measures to address security incidents and minimise the 
impact of such incidents on customers and on other interconnected networks; 
–  implement and maintain adequate risk management systems based on recognised 
international standards;  
                                                 
42  A number of factors are likely to contribute to increasing security threats. These include: The 
introduction of entirely new and potentially more destructive forms of malicious code and cyber attacks; 
the proliferation of new web applications, often with easy-to-exploit remote accessibility, the spread of 
instant messaging and peer-to-peer applications, the growth of mobile devices with always-on 
connectivity and remote access to critical sensitive data.
 See The Security Economy, OECD, 2004. 
43  http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/doc/com2006251.pdf 
44 “ Network and information security can be understood as the ability of a network or an information 
system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or malicious actions that compromise 
the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted data and the related 
services offered by or accessible via these networks and systems.” Communication from the 
Commission “Network and Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy Approach”, 
COM(2001) 298.  
EN  27     EN 
–  provide specific information to competent national authorities (e.g. on risk management 
systems, emergency plans), conduct audits of their information security systems and report 
to competent national authorities; and 
–  extend network integrity provision from PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) to 
mobile and IP-based networks used for public services. 
Such detailed measures could be included in the existing regulatory framework or some of the 
requirements could take the form of a regulation. 
Option 2 - Introduce general security and integrity requirements together with enabling 
measures  
This option aims at strengthening specific security and integrity measures but without 
prescribing detailed requirements and obligations at the EU level. This ‘enabling’ option 
would include the specification of general obligations on network and service providers, with 
the Commission able to adopt (binding) technical implementing measures where needed
45. 
Specific powers over enforcement and implementation would be granted to NRAs or other 
competent authorities. Any such technical implementing measures would be based on a broad 
public consultation and stakeholder dialogue as foreseen in the Commission Communication a 
strategy for a secure information society (COM(2006) 251). 
Option 3 - No change to the regulatory framework  
Under this option, the Commission would continue to rely on the existing provisions in the 
current regulatory framework and on initiatives carried out by private undertakings, industry 
associations, consumer protection organisations and security industry without reserve powers 
granted to NRAs or competent authorities. There would be differences in interpretation and 
application of some vaguely defined provisions, such as “appropriate technical and 
organisational measures”, among Member States. Some NRAs may impose very different 
requirements on market players and thus create difficulties or even barriers for companies 
operating in different Member States. 
5.6.4.  Comparison of options and impacts 
Option 1  (introduce new, detailed provisions) imposes detailed security and integrity 
measures at the EU level and would lead to a uniform application of security and integrity 
rules across the EU. It provides clarity and legal certainty as to what these obligations will be, 
but lacks flexibility to deal with newly emerging security threats. It also increases regulatory 
and administrative burden on market players. 
Option 2 (introduce general requirements together with enabling measures) provides such 
flexibility, but with the consequence that market players do not know in advance precisely 
what obligations could be applied to them. 
                                                 
45  The described approach would solve the current problem related to different definitions given by 
Member States to terms such as “appropriate technical and organisational measures” (see the study 
‘Preparing the next steps of eCommunications’, Hogan & Hartson LLP and Analysys, 2006) and would 
provide with improved integration between national markets.  
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Option 3 (no change) does not impose any new binding obligations. Some self-regulatory 
activities have been undertaken to date but the evidence suggests that they are not sufficient to 
resolve the problems identified above. 
See Annex 4 for the summary tables on main likely impacts arising from the each of the three 
policy options. 
The Commission considers that a mixture of the first and the second option offers the best 
balance of predictability and flexibility to allow future security threats to be addressed in a 
timely way. 
5.7.  Other areas 
Chapters 5.1 to 5.6 above have explored the areas where the main policy implications can be 
identified. There are also a large number of other detailed areas where the framework could 
be improved, as is evident from the list of changes in the Commission Staff Working 
Document annexed to the Communication. At this stage, it would not be proportionate to 
analyse each of these proposals in detail, and what follows is an outline of their impact to the 
main key players. As noted in Chapter 2, the analysis will be refined in the second report that 
will provide a more detailed impact assessment of the Commission’s concrete legislative 
proposals.  
5.7.1.  Changes which would primarily affect government bodies or national bodies 
(a)  Make appeals mechanism more effective; 
(b)  Introduce procedure for EU coordination of conditions attached to 
spectrum rights, general authorisation and selection for services with a 
pan-European scope; 
(c)  Improve enforcement mechanisms of the framework;  
(d)  Strengthen the obligation on Member States to review and justify 
‘must carry’ rules; 
(e)  Improve access to emergency services for disabled users via the 
number ‘112’; 
The key players in this category are governments or national bodies. The changes are 
designed to either make the eCommunications sector more productive (a-d in the above list) 
or to benefit consumers (e). 
5.7.2.  Changes which are primarily enabling in nature and which do not have immediate 
impact  
(f)  Amend Article 5 of the Access Directive: non-SMP access and 
interconnection; 
(g)  Introducing a procedure for Member States to agree common 
requirements related to networks or services;  
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(h)  Introduce the possibility of binding Commission Decisions for 
numbering aspects; 
(i)  Separate the provision of access to public communications networks 
from the provision of telephone services; 
(j)  Adapting the regulatory framework to cover telecommunications 
terminal equipment, ensuring constancy with the R&TTE Directive 
1999/5/EC; 
(k)  Ensure that regulators can impose minimum quality of service 
requirements; 
(l)  Introduce a Community mechanism to address eAccessibility issues; 
(m)  Repeal of Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local 
loop; 
(n)  Delete Annex I of the Framework Directive, Article 27 of the 
Framework Directive, Article 5(4) of the Access and Interconnection 
Directive; and 
(o)  Adapt ‘telephone service’ specific provisions to technology and 
market developments. 
These changes are primarily about enabling the Commission to adopt implementing measures 
where appropriate. Such measures could lead to obligations on Member States and/or on 
market players and the impact of such measures would need to be assessed on a case by case 
basis. 
5.7.3.  Changes which will apply directly to market players but will not be implemented 
until around 2009-2010  
Some changes in this category will lead to new obligations on network operators and service 
providers, i.e.: 
(a)  The amendment to Article 28 of the Universal Service Directive 
requiring cross border access to information society services; 
(b)  Improving transparency and publication of information to end-users; 
(c)  Requiring caller location information to be passed to emergency 
services; and 
(d)  Oblige operators to take security measures, and grant powers to NRAs 
to determine and monitor technical implementation. 
Other changes will remove current obligations on operators and/or service providers: 
(a)  Remove obligation to provide directories and directory inquiry 
services (at retail level);   
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(b)  Delete the minimum set of leased lines; and 
(c)  Withdrawal of Article 27(2) of the Universal Service Directive on 
ETNS (European telephony numbering space). 
6.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
The Commission annual implementation reports on European electronic communications 
regulation and markets provide comprehensive data and analysis of market, regulatory and 
consumer developments in the sector. The latest report of 2005 (published in February 2006) 
was the 11
th consecutive report that for the second time covered the sector in 25 Member 
States.
46 
These reports are assembled on the basis of information received from various sources in 
particular through missions carried out in the Member States by staff of the Directorates 
General for Information Society and Media and for Competition, analysis of the notifications 
of national transposition and implementing measures received from Member States, market 
data received from national regulatory authorities and surveys commissioned on price 
developments.  
The annual implementation reports will remain the main tool for monitoring and evaluating 
the implementation of the regulatory framework.  
                                                 
46  See footnote 6 for the web site where the reports are available.  
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Annex 1 - Overview of the regulatory framework for eCommunications 
The current framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(eCommunications) emerged from the wide-ranging debate that was stimulated by the 
Commission’s 1997 Green Paper on Convergence
47, the main technological trend of which 
has been shaping the sector during the past decade.  
The regulatory framework modernised and simplified the old telecommunications rules to 
reflect the emerging multi-platform convergent environment. Compared with the old set of 22 
Directives applicable in the sector, the main legislative instruments of the framework 
comprise only six Directives and associated measures, which cover both commercial dealings 
between operators and with their customers, under the supervision of the national regulatory 
authorities.
48  
e-Privacy Directive
Framework 
Directive
(Art. 95)
Authorisation Directive
Access & Interconnection 
Directive
Guidelines on 
significant market power
Recommendation on 
relevant markets
Liberalisation
Directive
(Art. 86)
Universal Service & Users’ 
Rights Directive Spectrum
Decision
(Art. 95)
 
The framework provides a single, common set of rules for all communications that are 
transmitted electronically, whether wireless or fixed, data or voice, Internet-based or circuit 
switched, broadcast or personal.
49 Its objectives are to encourage competition in the electronic 
communications markets, to improve the functioning of the Internal Market and to protect the 
interests of European citizens.
 50 Its legal basis is therefore Article 95 of the EC Treaty.
51 The 
                                                 
47 COM(1997)  623,  see.:  http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/greenp.html 
48  More information on the framework can be also found at:   
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/todays_framework/index_en.htm 
49  Regulation of commercial content services – such as Information Society Services and broadcasting – 
that may be offered over transmission infrastructures are covered by other Community instruments 
(such as the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and the TV Without Frontiers Directive 89/552/EEC). 
Information society services are defined in Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations as “any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing and 
storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a service” (Art. 1). 
50  Article 8 of the Framework Directive.  
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framework seeks to establish a stable and predictable regulatory environment in Europe that 
encourages innovation and stimulates new investment in communications networks and 
services, by both new entrants and existing operators. The aim is to ensure a level playing 
field for new companies in the market and provide users with basic services at affordable 
prices, while rolling back regulation as normal competition takes hold. 
The rules also allow EU citizens and businesses to enjoy the full benefits of the Internal 
Market. Where market forces alone may not fully meet the public interest, the framework 
safeguards consumer interests and guarantees basic user rights in areas such as universal 
service and processing of personal data and right to privacy. 
The framework is technology-neutral, applying the same regulatory principles regardless of 
the technology involved. It is designed to be future proof, and to take account of the 
convergence of digital technologies that allow everything from phone calls to entertainment to 
be delivered over all sorts of networks to all sorts of devices - PCs, televisions, mobile 
phones, wire and wireless technologies and more. 
For purposes of market entry rules, for access and inter-connection of networks, and for ex 
ante  regulation, the regulatory framework covers all transmission infrastructures (such as 
cable networks, satellite transmission networks, wireless networks and telecoms networks) in 
a consistent way. The framework operates at the level of communications infrastructure, and 
is essentially about securing a competitive market for transport of bits.  
The  main elements of the framework’s legislative instruments can be summarised as 
follows: 
•  Framework Directive setting out the main principles, objectives and procedures for an 
EU regulatory policy regarding the provision of electronic communications services and 
networks.  
•  Access and Interconnection Directive stipulating procedures and principles for imposing 
pro-competitive obligations regarding access to and interconnection of networks on 
operators with significant market power.  
•  Authorisation Directive introducing a system of general authorisation, instead of 
individual or class licences, to facilitate entry in the market and reduce administrative 
burdens on operators.  
•  Universal Service Directive requiring a minimum level of availability and affordability of 
basic electronic communications services and guaranteeing a set of basic rights for users 
and consumers of electronic communications services.  
•  e-Privacy Directive setting out rules for the protection of privacy and of personal data 
processed in relation to communications over public communication networks.  
                                                                                                                                                         
51  The Liberalisation Directive, i.e. Commission Directive 2002/77EC on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 249, 17.09.2002, p. 21), which is not covered 
by this review, is based on Article 86.  
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•  Commission Competition Directive consolidating the legal measures based on Article 86 
of the Treaty that have liberalised the telecommunications sector over the years. (Not 
covered by this review). 
•  The Commission recommendation on relevant markets defining a list of 18 sub-markets to 
be examined by national regulatory authorities. 
In addition, the Commission has adopted Radio Spectrum Decision (622/2002/EC) that seeks 
to ensure availability and efficient use of spectrum within the Internal Market and thus 
contributes to the implementation of the framework
52. 
The implementation of the framework depend heavily upon the work of the independent 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in each Member State while the processes created by 
the framework aim to ensure coordination and harmonisation of national efforts to create a 
consistent European market. 
To manage and implement the system, the Framework established two committees
53:  
–  Communications Committee (Chair and secretariat: Commission; Members: 
representatives of national ministries and regulatory authorities): regulatory and advisory 
functions on implementation of the directives. 
–  Radio Spectrum Committee (Chair and secretariat: Commission; Members: 
representatives of national ministries and regulatory authorities): deals with technical 
issues around harmonisation of radio frequency allocation across Europe and is developing 
an external radio spectrum policy across Europe. 
and the Commission set up two policy groups:  
–  European Regulators Group (Chair: Elected from and by Members; Members: Heads of 
the independent national regulatory authorities; Secretariat: Commission): facilitates 
consistent application of the regime throughout Member States. 
–  Radio Spectrum Policy Group (Chair: elected from and by members; Members: High 
level governmental expert from Member States and high level Commission representative; 
Secretariat: Commission): a platform for Member States, the Commission and stakeholders 
to coordinate the use of radio spectrum. 
A key element of the framework is a Commission Recommendation on relevant markets 
which identifies the markets that may justify ex-ante regulation. The so-called Article 7 
procedure requires the national regulatory authorities to notify the regulatory measures they 
intend to take in a certain market to the European Commission and the other NRAs, prior to 
their adoption. Any proposal by a NRA to deviate from a market identified in the Commission 
Recommendation must be agreed with the Commission. This construction aims to provide 
flexibility, since a Commission Recommendation can be changed relatively quickly to take 
                                                 
52  Note that the Spectrum Decision is not only specific to electronic communication but it applies also to 
many other sectors using spectrum such as transport and earth observation. 
53  Meetings of these groups and committees may also be attended by experts from EEA states and by EU 
accession candidates. Moreover, other experts and representatives from stakeholder associations may be 
invited to attend non-restricted parts of meetings.  
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account of technological and market developments, while it also allows NRAs to specify 
markets which may be unique to a particular Member State. 
The regulatory framework is based on five fundamental principles of regulation: 
(2)  Regulation should be kept to a minimum. 
(3)  Regulation should be based on clearly defined policy objectives of: 
(a)  fostering economic growth and competitiveness; and 
(b)  ensuring that objectives of general interest are met where they are not satisfied 
by market forces alone. 
(4)  Regulation should strike the right balance between flexibility and legal certainty. 
(5)  Regulation should be technologically neutral or objectively justifiable if it is not. 
(6)  Regulation may be agreed globally, regionally or nationally, but should be enforced as 
closely as is practicable to the activities being regulated.  
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Annex 2 - Information sources, consultation and expertise 
Public ‘call for input’ on the review  
–  Call for input on the forthcoming review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications and services (published on 25 November 2005) 
–  A public workshop on the review (24.01.2006) 
Studies and surveys commissioned from the external consultants for the review 
–  Preparing the next steps of eCommunications - a contribution to the Review of the 
eCommunications regulatory framework", Hogan & Hartson LLP and Analysys 
Consulting, 2006 
–  An assessment of the regulatory framework for electronic communications – growth and 
investment in the EU eCommunications sector, London Economics and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006  
–  Eurobarometer Special – eCommunications household survey, 2006  
Commission Reports on Implementation of the Regulatory Package 
–  Implementation reports on European Electronic Communications Regulations and Markets 
- Annual reports covering the period of 1997-2005  
–  Communication on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating 
the internal market for electronic communications (COM(2006) 28) 
Committees and Working Groups 
–  Communications Committee  
–  Radio Spectrum Committee 
–  Radio Spectrum Policy Group  
–  European Regulators Group 
–  Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data (‘Article 29 Working Party’)  
–  eEurope Advisory Group 
Stakeholder consultations and workshops organised in 2004-2006 
–  Workshop on Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS) 
(February 2006)  
–  Workshop on mobile broadcasting - Technological developments, market opportunities 
regulations and policy (23 February 2006)  
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–  Workshop on Spectrum Requirements for Road Safety (February, 2006) 
–  Conference on 112 single European emergency number (October 2005) 
–  Open Workshop on Public Policy treatment of digital terrestrial television (DTTV) in 
communication markets (September 2005) 
–  Workshop on Location-based Services and the e-Privacy Directive (July, 2005) 
–  Open Workshop Identifying policy and regulatory issues of Next Generation Networks 
(June 2005) 
–  Scope of Universal Service in eCommunications: public consultation on the Commission's 
preliminary review assessment and longer-term issues on universal service provision (May 
2005) 
–  Premium Rate Services in Europe: Presentation of findings of study (by Cullen 
International and WIK Consult) with opportunity to comment (June 2005)  
–  Freephone Services in Europe: dedicated to cross-border access and access to "00800” 
(June 2005) 
–  Public consultation and workshop on combating ’spam’ (November, 2004) 
–  Public consultation and workshop on traffic data retention (September 2004) 
–  Public consultation on the regulatory treatment of VoIP under the EU regulatory 
framework (June, 2004) 
–  Public consultation and public hearing on interoperability of digital interactive TV 
services (March 2004) 
Other Commission Reports 
–  Horizontal evaluation of the performance of network industries providing services of 
general economic interest, Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2005) 1781) 
Other external studies (commissioned by DG Information Society and Media) 
–  Study on pan-European market for premium rate services (September 2005) 
–  Report on the public policy treatment of digital terrestrial television (DTT) in 
communications markets (September 2005) 
–  Supply of services in monitoring of South East Europe – telecommunications services and 
related aspects; Report 1- Country Comparative Report (August 2005)  
–  Report on Telecoms Price Developments from 1998 to 2004 (October 2004) 
–  Telecoms services indicators 2004 (September 2004) 
–  Study on spectrum management in the field of broadcasting (June 2004)  
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–  Study on conditions and options in introducing secondary trading of radio spectrum in the 
European Community (May 2004)  
–  Study on Internet protocol (IP) voice and associated convergent services (February 2004)  
–  Study on Internet Access Costs Via a Standard Telephone Line, ADSL, and Cable Modem 
(January 2004) 
–  Economic Expert Group on Remedies (November 2003) 
–  Study on Barriers to Competition in the Supply of Electronic Communications Networks 
and Services (November 2003) 
–  Study on the policy implications of convergence in the field of naming, numbering and 
addressing (September 2003) 
–  Study on regulatory implications of the introduction of Next Generation Networks and 
other new developments in electronic communications (June 2003) 
–  Study on the assessment of the Member States measures aimed at fulfilling certain general 
interest objectives linked to broadcasting, imposed on providers of electronic 
communications networks and services, in the context of the new regulatory framework 
(March 2003) 
–  Study on Interoperability, Service Diversity and Business Models in Digital Broadcasting 
Markets (March 2003)   
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.Annex 3  Overview of technological and market evolution  
The technological trends that were identified in 1999 - when the regulatory framework was 
designed
54 - are still evident today, but increasingly convergence is becoming a reality. Over 
the coming years, Next Generation Networks (NGN)
55 will progressively replace 
conventional networks, and Internet Protocol (IP) is set to become all pervasive. Fibre is 
being installed in the local access network, and wireless networks are proliferating.  
The fundamental difference between NGNs and today’s telecom networks is a shift from 
‘circuit-switched’ voice-based single service networks to ‘packet-based’ multi-service 
networks (of which ‘voice’ will be only one of a palette of available services).  
The NGN design implies that intelligence for the provision of various innovative services, 
which used to reside in the software-controlled switches inside the traditional networks, 
would be moved to the servers at the network edges. This enables the separation of service 
provision from network operation providing opportunities to those service providers, who are 
not at the same time operating the network facilities, to offer content, applications and 
services, possibly in competition with the facilities operators themselves.
56 
Graph  1  Evolution from multiple separate networks to IP-enabled multi-service 
network (NGN) 
 
                                                 
54  Communication COM(1999) 539, “Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications 
infrastructure and associated services”, see: 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/review99.htm 
55  The mostly commonly used definition of NGN is by ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union – 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector), in short: NGN is a packet based architecture fostering the 
provisioning of existing and new/emerging services through a loosely coupled, open and converged 
communications infrastructure. 
56  On NGNs and electronic communications regulation, see, for instance: Next Generation Network 
Development in the OECD countries, OECD, 2005; IP voice and associated convergent services, 
Analysys: 2004; Regulatory implications of the introduction of next generation networks and other new 
developments in electronic communications, Cullen International, Devoteam Siticom 2003; Study on 
The Economics of IP Networks - Market, Technical and Public Policy Issues Relating to Internet 
Traffic Exchange, WIK-Consult, 2002. See also the web-site of the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) that provides an extensive collection of links to general and national NGN policies and 
regulatory initiatives: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ngn/ngn-policy-regulatory-resources.html.  
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It is difficult to estimate exactly how long the transitional period during which circuit-
switched networks are replaced by IP-enabled next generation networks but the future 
direction of change is obvious. Operators and equipment manufacturers are making 
substantial investments to NGNs, which will be deployed by numerous service providers 
around the globe in the coming years.
57 Estimates by experts and industry indicate that most 
major EU telecom operators will have their core networks replaced by IP-enabled NGNs 
around 2010.
58 This will produce greater flexibility and substantial cost savings (both CAPEX 
and OPEX
59) to the operators. 
At the same time, traditional markets are maturing and competition is driving market players 
to invest in new technologies which are delivering new innovative services launched on a 
wide range of platforms. Some will be wireline-based, such as optical fibres and coaxial 
cables, and many will be wireless, such as wireless LAN, 3G mobile networks, Wi-Fi, 
WiMAX or satellite.
60  
Wireless is becoming pervasive providing consumers with expanded opportunities to use 
communication services outside the limited area dictated by fixed networks, triggering the 
development of nomadic services and applications.
61 In many Member States, the number of 
mobile subscriptions already exceeds the number of fixed line subscriptions. 
Digital television is evolving towards high-definition television “HDTV” using advanced 
video coding “AVC”.
62 There is high interest in introducing multimedia services both in the 
traditional broadcasting as well as in the value chain of other electronic communications 
services such as mobile services (i.e. equipment manufacturers, operators and content 
providers). Furthermore, broadcasting services, representing an integral part of multimedia 
services, are beginning to merge with mobile services. Mobile broadcasting is an example of 
digital convergence that might become the next high growth consumer technology. Many 
field trials of “mobile TV” technology have been conducted in several Member States and 
first commercial services are already being launched. 
Telecom providers are becoming content distributors and cable companies are offering 
communications and internet, with the result that consumers are offered triple offers by cable 
operators and telecommunications providers (TV, internet access and telephone), or quadruple 
play (including wireless). Services through internet service providers (ISPs) are also rapidly 
changing to offer internet broadcasting, video and near video on demand as well as telephony.  
                                                 
57  In the NGN investments China leads with a third of all NGNs worldwide, followed closely by the 
United States with 26%, and the United Kingdom third with 13%. See Worldwide NGN Migration 
Status and Vendors Opportunity Analysis Report, Dittberner Associates, November 2005, see: 
http://www.dittberner.com/news/press_release.php?id=34, 
http://www.dittberner.com/reports/about.php?id=5 
58  Source: OVUM and European Telecommunications Platform (ETP), Cisco Systems and Italtel. In 2003 
Forrester Research predicted in its report ‘European Incumbent Telcos' VoIP Road Map’ that transition 
to NGN (total end-to-end fixed voice traffic based on IP) would be completed in Western Europe by 
2020; and 95% of enterprise voice calls would be VoIP-based by 2015. 
59  CAPEX = capital expenditures, OPEX = operational expenditures. 
60  Wi-Fi: wireless fidelity, WiMAX: Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, LAN = local area 
network. 
61  See for example Development of voice over WiFi by integrating mobile networks, OECD, 2005 
(DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2004)9/FINAL) and The implication of WiMAX for competition and regulation, 
OECD, 2006 (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)4/FINAL). 
62  See Digital Switchover Communication COM(2005) 204 final, 24.05.2005.  
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For the consumer, the convergent and global internet-based environment brings the possibility 
for innovation, new products and value for money as well as ever-increasing choice and 
complexity in terminals and services. This development also gives rise to new and more 
complicated threats to privacy and security.   
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Annex 4  Summary tables on main impacts arising from the policy options 
. 
INVESTMENT AND GROWTH (Chapter 5.1) 
IMPACT ON:  OPTION 1 
Limitation of ex ante regulation 
OPTION 2 
‘Open access’ model 
OPTION 3 
No change 
EU competitiveness  Strengthens the position of incumbents, 
risk of re-monopolisation of those 
markets which are not competitive and 
therefore reduced competitiveness of EU 
companies in some markets/Member 
States. 
Negative implications for current 
infrastructure owners. Possible loss of 
efficiency for EU firms through 
structural separation. 
Impact depends on how NRAs apply the 
current rules. Good application can 
increase competition and hence 
competitiveness of EU markets. 
 
Internal market   Fixed date for removal of ex ante 
regulation could distort EU market (with 
local monopolies in some 
markets/countries and competition in 
others).  
Same model in all MS would promote 
internal market. 
Depends on how consistently the 
framework is applied in Member States. 
Compliance cost for 
businesses 
Compliance costs reduced   Compliance  costs  remain  for 
infrastructure operator; lower costs for 
service providers.  
Cost of compliance with existing regulation 
(which should normally gradually decrease 
as markets become effectively competitive) 
Competition   Can lead to more infrastructure-based 
competition where alternative 
infrastructures are possible, however risk 
of re-monopolisation where infrastructure 
is difficult to duplicate (e.g. local loop). 
Strong service-based competition, less 
infrastructure-based competition where 
infrastructure can be duplicated. 
Outcome depends very much on 
implementation (correct application of 
principles, access and interconnection 
prices, etc.).   
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Innovation and 
investment 
May lead to more investment by 
incumbents (although not certain) but can 
drive alternative operators and new 
entrants out of market due to high entry 
barrier 
Risk of underinvestment in 
infrastructure, lower investment 
incentives for companies due to de facto 
structural separation of infrastructure and 
services.  
Encouragement for alternative operators 
to innovate and invest (in services rather 
than infrastructure). Higher predictability 
for investors.  
Competitive environment fostered by this 
type of regulation should normally induce 
investment (as supported by certain 
empirical evidence) but implementation 
plays a crucial role and it is necessary to 
avoid overregulation. Lower predictability 
of regulation can have slightly negative 
impact on investment and innovation.  
Consumers & 
households 
Risk of re-monopolisation and, as a 
consequence, higher consumer prices in 
markets where structural obstacles to 
competition persist (and where it is 
difficult to tackle them by competition 
law), risk of reduced choice for 
consumers in some markets. However, if 
alternative networks develop sufficiently 
fast, it could provide for sustainable 
competition and consumer benefits. 
Bigger choice of operators and services 
in the short term (may lead to price wars) 
but in the longer term risk of degradation 
of infrastructure and/or slow deployment 
of new of upgraded high-speed 
infrastructure.  
Positive impact on consumers in the form 
of more v choice and cheaper services. 
However, risk of slower development of 
new and innovative services and high-
speed networks if the right balance between 
regulation for competition and creating 
investment incentives is not found by the 
regulatory authorities.  
Operators  Positive impact on incumbents and 
operators with SMP, negative impact on 
some alternative operators and/or new 
entrants. 
Short-term positive impact on alternative 
operators and new entrants, negative on 
infrastructure owners. 
Positive impact on alternative operators 
and new entrants, negative impact on 
incumbents and other regulated 
undertakings.  
Administrative burden 
for EU and national 
administrations 
Substantial reduction of administrative 
burden if the sector-specific regulation is 
phased out. 
Administrative burden associated with 
regulation of local loop to prevent 
monopoly pricing.  
Administrative burden associated with 
regulation of markets which are found 
uncompetitive and with market analyses 
done by NRAs.  
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Employment and 
labour markets  
Could have positive employment effect 
for incumbents and big operators, 
probably negative employment effect on 
small alternative operators.  
Initially positive employment effects for 
alternative operators and new entrants, 
however this may change as markets 
begin to consolidate.  
Positive employment effects for alternative 
operators and new entrants, however, the 
overall effect may be negative as further 
consolidation and rationalisation could lead 
to loss of jobs in the electronic 
communications sector. 
Social inclusion   Impact depends also on accompanying 
measures such as universal service. If re-
monopolisation of some markets occurs 
as a result of no sector-specific 
regulation, higher prices and delays in 
rolling out new services can lead to 
widening the digital divide. 
Stronger service competition will lead to 
higher penetration of new services. 
Impact depends also on accompanying 
measures such as universal service. 
However, the risk of problems with 
maintenance and investment in 
infrastructure in a longer term (see 
above) is not excluded. 
Impact depends also on accompanying 
measures such as universal service. More 
competitive markets do generally lead to 
higher penetration of new services and 
could contribute to more inclusive 
provision of electronic communications 
services.   
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RADIO SPECTRUM (Chapter 5.2) 
IMPACT ON:  OPTION 1 
An EU entity/agency in charge of managing 
EU aspects of spectrum 
OPTION 2 
Wider application of committee 
mechanisms to improve coordination 
at EU level  
OPTION 3 
No change 
EU 
competitiveness 
Could enhance competitiveness of EU 
companies in all areas exploiting spectrum in 
their businesses.  
Could enhance competitiveness of EU 
through increased flexibility and co-
ordination of electronic communications 
spectrum management.  
The current system does not ensure the 
most efficient use of spectrum in all MS 
and would therefore not contribute to 
increasing competitiveness of EU 
companies. 
Achievement of 
single market 
Internal market for wireless services would be 
completed’ offering economies of scale for 
wireless applications. Problems during 
transition to harmonised spectrum may arise 
(due to diverging spectrum allocation in 
individual Member States). 
Co-ordination mechanism between the 
Commission and MS would lead to more 
consistent application of rules across the 
EU and to strengthening the single 
market.  
Different paths of spectrum management 
taken in different Member States could 
lead to further fragmentation of the 
internal market.  
Cost for 
businesses 
Lower cost of acquiring spectrum due to more 
flexibility and efficiency of the system. 
Economies of scale and scope for pan-
European wireless operators and for 
manufacturers. 
Similar to option 1, however, some 
compliance cost related to differences in 
regulation between Member States (in 
terms of spectrum management) could 
still remain. 
Cost related to compliance with 25 rather 
different systems of spectrum 
management, cost related to rigidity and 
inefficiency of spectrum management in 
many Member States, high cost of 
acquiring spectrum for new entrants where 
administrative allocation of spectrum 
prevails. 
Competition   Gradual centralisation of spectrum 
management would probably lead to 
consolidation of the wireless/mobile market 
with a few strong European players operating 
Co-ordinated removal of restrictions and 
mandatory spectrum trading in certain 
bands could lead to more consolidation 
of the wireless/mobile market and more 
Could result in a situation of unfair 
competition favouring those who currently 
hold spectrum and disadvantaging new 
entrants. Difficulties for pan-European  
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across the EU. More competitive pressure on 
broadcasters currently controlling large 
amounts of spectrum. Flexibility and easier 
access to spectrum will also create emergence 
of new services which will increase 
competition among system and service 
providers. It would also increase competition 
between platforms for provision of e-
communications services. 
competitive pressure on broadcasters to 
make more efficient use of spectrum. 
Flexibility and easier access to spectrum 
will also create emergence of new 
services which will increase competition 
among system and service providers. It 
would also increase competition between 
platforms for provision of e-
communications services. 
wireless services to develop because of 
lack of co-ordination. 
Innovation and 
investment 
More flexible and harmonised approach could 
encourage more investment and innovation. 
New entrants would be able to acquire 
spectrum through spectrum trading or operate 
in unlicensed bands.  
Similar to option 1.  Difficulties in responding to demands for 
spectrum in some bands could discourage 
investment and create barriers to entry for 
new entrants and hamper development of 
new technologies. 
Operators   Positive impact on big wireless operators active 
in several Member States, some operators could 
lose their position (no longer guaranteed by the 
administrative allocation/assignment model). 
Lower barrier to entry for new service 
providers and new/alternative wireless 
technologies.  
Similar to option 1.  Positive effect on those who currently hold 
spectrum and who have made major 
investments in licences. Negative impact 
on alternative operators and new entrants. 
Operators face differences between 
Member States progressing towards more 
flexible system and those using 
predominantly the administrative model.  
Consumers & 
households 
Benefits from cheaper and more innovative 
services across the EU, choice between 
different technologies. Difficulties in dealing 
with national particularities and different usage 
patterns in Member States, in particular for 
public interest objectives. 
Benefits from cheaper and more 
innovative services across the EU, choice 
between different technologies. Different 
usage patterns in individual Member 
States can be taken into account as 
spectrum management will still be done 
at national level.  
Limited choice of services, higher prices 
of wireless services (due to scarcity of 
spectrum), big differences between 
Member States in terms of availability of 
alternative technologies and price.  
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Administrative 
burden  
Gradual transfer of powers over spectrum 
regulation to a supra-national body may entail 
additional administrative cost. Risk of loss of 
expertise and local knowledge of competent 
national authorities.  
Some additional administrative burden 
related to transition to a more flexible 
and co-ordinated approach. However, the 
overall administrative burden should 
decrease in time as more spectrum will 
be subject to spectrum trading or general 
authorisations.  
No additional administrative burden 
(compared to the current situation), but no 
reduction either. Administrative burden on 
NRAs will differ according to the 
prevailing spectrum management model in 
their country.  
Employment 
and labour 
markets  
Difficult to predict the end result, however, 
probably for the existing eCommunications 
services, increased competition will should to 
withdrawal of inefficiencies and possibly a 
reorganisation of the market with positive 
employment effect on certain European 
wireless/mobile operators, and negative 
employment effect on inefficient operators. 
Flexibility and easier access to spectrum should 
create opportunities for new types of services 
with a positive impact on employment. 
Increased innovation opportunities should 
make the EU attractive for new technology 
development and be source of new 
employment. 
Similar  to  option  1.  Probably negative long term effect 
resulting from a lost potential for higher 
efficiency and growth of wireless 
technologies/services.  
Social inclusion   More choice and cheaper wireless services 
could contribute to more inclusive information 
society. Impact on social inclusion depends 
also on other factors, such as universal service. 
Similar to option 1.  Higher  consumer prices and potential 
consumer lock-in in existing 
services/technologies would probably not 
contribute to higher social inclusion.  
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REGULATORY MODEL AND THE INTERNAL MARKET (Chapter 5.3) 
IMPACT ON:  OPTION 1 
A single European regulator 
OPTION 2 
Strengthened role for the 
Commission to achieve Internal 
market objectives 
OPTION 3 
No change 
EU 
competitiveness 
Provides opportunity to enhance EU 
competitiveness (depending also on 
regulatory approach of the EU regulator) vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. 
Provides opportunity to develop 
competitive pan-European services. 
Fewer possibilities to develop pan-
European services. 
Achievement of 
internal market 
Internal market in electronic communication 
would be fully completed; high level of 
harmonisation in the internal market would 
be achieved. 
Reinforcement of single market in some 
aspects (e.g. veto on remedies, Article 
5(1) of the access directive) while 
preserving a certain degree of flexibility 
at national level. 
Persistent obstacles/barriers to single 
market, slower and difficult up-take of 
trans-national services in Europe. 
Compliance cost 
for businesses 
Lower compliance cost for pan-European 
operators. 
Lower compliance cost for operators of 
pan-European services, application of 
similar remedies in similar 
circumstances. 
Compliance costs resulting from different 
rules in different MS (e.g. wireless services 
provided across the EU). 
Competition   Competition among big pan-European 
players, consolidation of market players at 
the EU level, (depending on access and 
interconnection conditions set by the EU 
regulator). 
More harmonised conditions for 
competition, less divergent regulatory 
interventions in different MS. Easier 
entry for providers of pan-European 
services. 
Effectiveness of competition depending 
more on national regulation and 
implementation, differences in competition 
in individual Member States, higher risk of 
over-regulation in some Member States.   
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Innovation and 
investment 
Potential for enhancing innovation and 
investment (economies of scale and scope).  
More incentives of foreign investors to invest 
in the EU (benefits of fully harmonised 
regulatory environment). 
More incentives for innovation and 
investment in pan-European services, 
more consistent application of remedies 
and therefore possibly more certainty for 
investors. 
Investment and innovation would happen 
more within national markets, less 
incentive to invest EU-wide, probably 
lower incentive for non-EU market players 
to invest in Europe (compared to other 
options). 
Consumers  Consistent implementation of consumer 
provisions throughout the EU 
Improved benefits for consumers if the 
framework is applied and implemented 
correctly in all Member States); potential 
for cheaper pan-European wireless 
services.  
Diverging prices and service offerings, 
reduced possibility for consumer to benefit 
from new pan-European wireless services.  
Operators  Probably more beneficial for big pan-
European players than for the small ones. 
Positive impact on operators providing 
pan-European services, creates more 
level-playing field for operators in 
different MS (compared to option 3). 
Obstacles for operators providing services 
in several Member States, difficulties in 
complying with different regulatory 
regimes, risk of over-regulation.  
Administrative 
burden  
Depends on the model of EU regulator: if 
NRAs remain operational and EU regulator 
represents another layer of regulation, 
administrative burden will rather increase. If 
NRAs cease to exist, their expertise and local 
knowledge could be lost. 
Veto on remedies could lead to delays in 
their application. 
No additional administrative costs. 
Employment and 
labour markets 
Could increase employment as a result of 
increased European competitiveness. 
Possibly some positive employment 
effect linked to new pan European 
services. 
No major changes in employment. 
Social inclusion   Depends on accompanying policies, such as 
universal service or support for low-income 
users. 
Similar to Option 1.  Similar to Option 1. 
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MARKET REVIEW PROCEDURES (Chapter 5.4) 
IMPACT ON:  OPTION 1 
Remove Art. 7 procedure 
OPTION 2 
Relax Art. 7 notification 
requirements 
OPTION 3 
No change 
Single market  No oversight from the Commission 
would necessarily lead to more 
fragmentation of markets and increase 
differences in regulatory approach of 
individual MS. Higher risk of slow 
and/or incorrect application in some 
Member States. 
(Note: impacts of European regulator 
and no sector-specific regulation are 
analysed under the corresponding 
headings). 
The system of notifications would 
continue to contribute to more consistent 
regulation and to creation of single 
market, notwithstanding the introduction 
of simplified procedure for certain cases. 
The system of notifications would continue 
to contribute to more consistent regulation 
and to creation of single market. 
Compliance cost for 
businesses 
Cost related to compliance with 
differences in regulation in the 25 (or 
more) Member States, especially for 
pan-European operators. Compliance 
cost related to market reviews would 
remain in place.  
Less divergence in regulatory approach 
of the NRAs (compared to option 1), 
therefore less compliance cost associated 
with differences in regulation across the 
EU. Compliance cost related to market 
reviews would remain in place. 
Similar to option 2. 
Administrative burden 
for NRAs  
Lower administrative burden for 
NRAs since there would be no formal 
notifications to the Commission. 
Lower burden for NRAs in small 
countries and new Member States.  
Lower administrative burden for NRAs 
(compared to the current situation) due 
to simplified notifications for certain 
cases. However, administrative burden 
for NRAs from new Member States 
would remain similar. 
Administrative burden for NRAs and the 
Commission would stay the same (it could 
be lower than at present only if the number 
of relevant markets required for 
notification is reduced).  
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Competition   Differences in regulatory approach 
(market definition, use of remedies, 
etc.) can lead to very different 
outcomes in terms of competition in 
individual Member States. 
This approach aims at creating similar 
competitive environment across the EU; 
however, the final outcome also depends 
on efficient and effective regulation 
pursued by individual NRAs.  
Similar to Option 2. 
Innovation and 
investment 
Less incentive to invest for big market 
players operating in several Member 
States, probably lower investment 
from third countries (due to 
differences in regulatory environment 
in each MS). 
Should create more consistent regulatory 
environment across the EU, therefore 
more incentives to invest in different 
Member States (although it has to be 
recognised that investment depends on a 
number of other factors) compared to 
Option 1. 
Not significantly different from option 2. 
Consumers & 
households 
Differences in NRA approaches create 
risk of increased differences in 
consumer benefits, choice and prices 
of services in the different Member 
States. 
Provides more consistency of NRA 
approaches and hence allows consumers 
to benefit in all MS. 
Similar to Option 2. 
Employment and 
labour markets 
No  direct  effect.    No direct effect. Indirectly, positive 
impact on single market could have 
indirect positive effect on employment. 
No direct effect. Indirectly, positive impact 
on single market could have indirect 
positive effect on employment. 
Social inclusion   No direct effect.   No direct effect.  No direct effect.   
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SECURITY AND INTEGRITY (Chapter 5.6) 
IMPACT ON:  OPTION 1 
A new detailed provision on 
security and integrity 
OPTION 2 
Introduce general requirements 
together with enabling measures 
OPTION 3 
No change 
EU competitiveness  Additional regulatory burden on 
companies could have negative impact 
on competitiveness in the short term, 
but a positive impact in the long term 
by increasing consumer confidence in 
ICT.  
Similar to option 1, but actual 
regulatory burden depends on detailed 
implementation and results of 
stakeholder dialogue.  
No additional burden on companies in the 
short term, but risk of negative impact if 
growth of ICTs is limited by lack of consumer 
confidence. 
 
Achievement of single 
market 
Could foster the single market since 
there would be no diverging 
interpretations or applications of the 
security requirements defined in EU 
law. 
Similar to option 1.   No improvement of the single market in this 
area 
Compliance cost for 
businesses 
Increases compliance cost for 
businesses due to new obligations 
placed on them. 
Similar to option 1, but depends on 
detailed implementation and results of 
stakeholder dialogue. 
No further compliance cost imposed on 
businesses, differences in specific 
requirements in individual MS. 
Innovation and 
investment 
Risk of stifling innovation if too heavy 
burden is imposed on businesses. On 
the other hand, could create incentives 
for companies to invest more in 
security and help raise awareness of 
security problems. 
Similar to option 1.  Risk of insufficient investment in security and 
prevention of incidents (especially for SMEs).  
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Network Operators  Obligations are predictable but, no 
flexibility for the legislation to adapt 
to new market situation, new threats 
or new solutions. No scope for greater 
involvement of the industry (co-
regulation or self-regulation). 
Security measures more “tailored” to 
the needs of the industry. More 
involvement and dialogue with 
stakeholders before concrete 
measures are taken; however less 
predictability and certainty about the 
final outcome.  
Patchwork of different security measures 
imposed on undertakings in different MS; risk 
of insufficient incentive to invest in security 
measures; no economies of scale achieved at 
EU level. 
Consumers & 
households 
More attention paid to security of 
services, applications and networks if 
new security legislation is properly 
enforced.  
Prices of products and services could 
go up in the short-term if companies 
pass a part of their increased cost onto 
the consumer. 
Similar  to  Option  1.  No improvements in security/integrity of 
networks for consumers, remaining 
differences between individual Member 
States; consumer trust in ICT systems could 
decline. 
Administrative burden 
for national and 
European public 
administrations 
Need of transposition of new 
measures in national legislations and 
their enforcement by NRAs. 
Somewhat more than in option 1, due 
to more enforcement and 
implementation powers granted to 
NRAs. 
No additional administrative burden. 
Employment and 
labour markets 
Could have positive employment 
effects on vendors of security products 
Similar to option 1.  No direct employment effect.  
Social inclusion   No direct impact on social inclusion. 
However, if the overall level of 
network and information security 
increases, this may have positive 
impact on up-take of new 
services/products by consumers. 
Similar  to  option  1.  Insufficient overall level of security (unless 
changed by initiatives of the private sector) 
could deter some users from using ICT, 
particularly internet-related applications.  
 